The impact of the European Union current crisis on law, policy and society. by Chirita,  Anca D.
Durham Research Online
Deposited in DRO:
12 February 2016
Version of attached ﬁle:
Accepted Version
Peer-review status of attached ﬁle:
Peer-reviewed
Citation for published item:
Chirita, Anca D. (2015) 'The impact of the European Union current crisis on law, policy and society.', in The
Cambridge yearbook of European legal studies : Volume 16, 2013-2014. Oxford: Hart Publishing, pp. 255-288.
Further information on publisher's website:
http://www.hartpub.co.uk/BookDetails.aspx?ISBN=9781849466288
Publisher's copyright statement:
Additional information:
Use policy
The full-text may be used and/or reproduced, and given to third parties in any format or medium, without prior permission or charge, for
personal research or study, educational, or not-for-proﬁt purposes provided that:
• a full bibliographic reference is made to the original source
• a link is made to the metadata record in DRO
• the full-text is not changed in any way
The full-text must not be sold in any format or medium without the formal permission of the copyright holders.
Please consult the full DRO policy for further details.
Durham University Library, Stockton Road, Durham DH1 3LY, United Kingdom
Tel : +44 (0)191 334 3042 | Fax : +44 (0)191 334 2971
http://dro.dur.ac.uk
 The Impact of the European Union Current Crisis on Law, Policy and Society 
 16 Cambridge Yearbook of European Studies (2014) 255-288 
 
ANCA D CHIRITA* 
Abstract 
This chapter aims to understand the general nature of the current economic crisis 
from a socio-legal, economic, ideological and political perspective and to analyse the 
complexity of the multiple causes which have led to this crisis. The impact of the crisis 
on different areas of law is also considered, especially on banking, securities, contract, 
competition and corporate law. Furthermore, the article aims to criticise law in action 
and the management of the crisis through political decision-making (state 
intrusiveness), that is, the various responses and reactions to the crisis and the 
effectiveness of the measures implemented by policy-makers and enforcers. In 
particular, this article questions the constitutional legitimacy of the TBTF (Too-Big-to-
Fail) theory as a predominant doctrine and criterion of state intervention in the 
economy. The chapter carries out a multi-layered analysis that covers aspects of 
economic, social, and political governance. It also draws insights from 
microeconomics – looking at how economic agents have affected individuals such as 
consumers – and from macroeconomics – looking at how state intervention in the 
economy has impacted upon taxpayers and considering the economic and social costs 
of the crisis. Finally, it approaches the crisis from the perspective of political economy 
by looking through the lenses of ideology and policy and by reflecting on the role of 
neoliberalism today. 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The purpose of this chapter is to understand the general nature of the current crisis 
(banking, financial, debt, currency, constitutional, political) from a socio-legal, 
economic, ideological and political perspective and to analyse the complexity of the 
multiple causes which led to it. Interdisciplinary areas of law in which the crisis has 
manifested itself will be highlighted throughout this chapter, in particular financial, 
banking, securities, contract, competition and corporate law. Finally, the chapter aims 
to criticise the legal response and the management of the crisis through political 
decision-making (state intrusiveness), that is, the various responses and reactions to 
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the crisis and the effectiveness of the measures implemented by policy-makers and 
enforcers, and to question the constitutional legitimacy of the TBTF (Too-Big-to-Fail) 
theory as a predominant doctrine and criterion of state intervention in the economy.  
The methodology of this chapter is interdisciplinary and encompasses law, 
economics, and politics. A multi-layered level of economic, social, and political 
governance is envisaged through insights from microeconomics, by looking at how 
economic agents have affected individuals such as consumers; from macroeconomics, 
by looking at how state intervention in the economy has impacted upon taxpayers 
and the economic and social costs of the crisis; and from political economy by looking 
through the lenses of ideology and policy and reflecting on the role of neoliberalism 
today.  
The heavy reliance on the TBTF doctrine became an EU ‘Too Big to Crash’ 
theme amid fears of an eventual repeat of the 1929 Wall Street Crash, which to date 
has been avoided by all possible means of political intervention. Unfortunately, 
competition law could be seen as the scapegoat of this unprecedented restructuring 
of the banking and financial markets through the use of generous state aid to benefit 
inefficient financial game players. This last recognition leads us to question the 
adequacy of measures of profit-seeking capitalism. 
The structure of this chapter is as follows. After a brief introduction, Section II 
questions the nature of the crisis and its origins. It explains both the micro- and the 
macroeconomic level of intervention in times of crisis, and it highlights the need to 
address the failures of both public and private economic actors. Section III digs deeper 
into the roots of the crisis and generally classifies the major disturbing causes playing 
a role in the current crisis. In turn, Section IV focuses on one particular cause of the 
problem, namely the behavioural exploitation of consumers by bankers and states 
through the use of a low interest rate stimulus. It critically engages with the EU high 
unemployment rate and challenges its austerity policies. Section V contrasts the 
existing convergence criteria for harmonious EU economic development across 
Member States with the current economic outlook and challenges the critical and 
apparent legitimacy of bailouts. The lack of democratic legitimacy of the latter is 
exacerbated by the social and economic costs of the EU crisis, which are the subject 
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of Section VI. In particular the main categories of state aid will be explored here, as 
well as the political and the institutional dimension of the crisis. Section VII will explain 
the widespread financial derivative contracts which are the object of the recent 
investigations conducted by the European Commission (EC). These investigations 
culminated with record fines, which will be discussed in greater detail in Section VIII. 
Finally, Section IX engages with the neoliberal ideology and challenges it as a social 
model of economic governance. Looking back at previous positions on social and 
corporate responsibility, employment, and capital mobility, the chapter is able to 
identify an overarching critical edge to the current scenario, in the form of the 
financialisation of global markets. 
II. ON THE NATURE AND ORIGIN OF THE CRISIS 
The nature of the current crisis has been determined by the sectors of the economy 
which are most affected by economic failures. As large financial institutions such as 
commercial, investment or securities banks and other major corporations have 
experienced a large number of defaults, this has first been recognised as a banking 
crisis.1 However, a greater risk to affect and spread the banking crisis to other 
financial institutions has made it systemic. Before the crisis, banks experienced longer 
periods of credit expansion, which had also led to a rise of real estate and equity 
prices, above the gross domestic product (GDP). On the negative side, the credit 
boom reached a peak and burst into a price ‘bubble’, ie house prices fell below 
outstanding balances on home mortgages. Thus, a sovereign debt crisis then emerged 
as defaults on payments of debt obligations became the rule, which called for the 
                                                 
* This chapter is based on the CELS Seminar in the University of Cambridge, 16 October 2013, and a 
Pre-sessional Lecture on ‘Competition, Financial Markets and the Economic Crisis’, Josephine Butler 
College, Durham, 11 September 2013. I would like to thank Dr Albertina Albors-Llorens, Dr Markus 
Gehring, Dr Folarin Akinbami, and Professor Kenneth Armstrong for extremely helpful comments and 
insightful discussions. 
1
 See, eg, CM Reinhart and KS Rogoff, This Time is Different: Eight Centuries of Financial Folly (Princeton 
NJ, Princeton University Press, 2009); J de Haan, S Oosterloo and D Schoenmaker, Financial Markets 
and Institutions: A European Perspective, 2nd edn (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2012); S 
Valdez and P Molyneux, An Introduction to Global Financial Markets, 7th edn (Basingstoke, Palgrave 
Macmillian, 2013). 
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restructuring of the banking sector. This process meant offering debtors less 
favourable terms than the expected capital gains.  
One cannot fully understand the nature of the crisis without questioning first 
its origins. The global crisis emerged first in the US subprime market,2 which 
generated losses during summer 2007 to mid-2008. Hundreds of billions of dollars in 
bad mortgage loans initially set at bargain rates3 were reset at market rates so that 
when housing prices started to fall, owners defaulted on their payments. This was 
followed by the bail-out of Bear Stearns; the nationalisation of mortgage agencies 
Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac; and the Lehman Brothers’ bankruptcy in September 
2008. Until late October of that year, a global loss of confidence created a systemic 
risk of collapse.  
The recession manifested itself through sharp increases in budget deficits and 
slow economic recovery. In addition, the limits of the Stability and Growth Pact of 
19974 were breached. After September 2008, European Union (EU) rescue policies 
focused on restoring the liquidity of banks and guarantees, while the ECB (European 
Central Bank) and national central banks outside the euro adjusted the provision of 
liquidity and cut interest rates.5 The Recovery Plan provided a discretionary fiscal 
stimulus of €200 billion, which was used for budgetary expansion rather than to 
‘boost demand and stimulate confidence’.6 A Financial Stabilisation Mechanism 
provided Member States with another €500 billion. Not until mid-March 2009, were 
there any signs of stabilisation.7 
                                                 
2
 See M Jarsulic, ‘The Origins of the US Financial Crisis of 2007: How a House-Price Bubble, a Credit 
Bubble, and Regulatory Failure Caused the Greatest Economic Disaster since the Great Depression’ in 
MH Wolfson and GA Epstein (eds), The Handbook of the Political Economy of Financial Crisis (Oxford, 
Oxford University Press, 2013) 30; P Krugman and R Wells, Macroeconomics, 3rd edn (New York, 
Worth’s Publishers, 2013) 432. 
3
 Interest rates were extremely low due to large capital flows from abroad to the US economy, the US 
Federal Reserve, and low inflation. See, eg, Jarsulic, n 2 above. 
4
 See R Guttman and D Plihon, ‘Whither the Euro? History and Crisis of Europe’s Single-Currency 
Project’ in Wolfson and Epstein, n 2 above, 368. 
5
 See, eg, C Quigley, ‘Review of the Temporary State Aid Rules Adopted in the Context of the Financial 
and Economic Crisis’ (2012) 3 Journal of European Competition Law & Practice 237; see generally C 
Quigley and AM Collins, EC State Aid Law and Policy (Oxford, Hart Publishing, 2003). 
6
 Ibid. 
7
 See, eg, positive signs are noted in ‘Towards a Genuine Economic and Monetary Union’, available at: 
www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/en/ec/134069.pdf. 
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Unique due to its geo-political architecture, the EU crisis revealed that it is not 
solely private economic actors who can default on their contractual obligations. 
Member States such as Greece failed to keep up with their borrowing costs. 
Furthermore, the political pursuits of monetary union and its single currency 
highlighted the complexity of the crisis at the microeconomic level. At the 
macroeconomic level, there was also a risk that Member States which maintained 
fixed exchange rates could also experience a currency crisis where the value of the 
national currency fell suddenly as a result of a loss of confidence followed by 
speculative attacks.8  
The events in Greece led the EU to reconsider both the political and the 
constitutional dimension of the sovereign debts crisis. In May 2010, the EU set a 
precedent by granting a total of €80 billion to Greece.9 In this context, the solidarity 
with Greece’s economic failure triggered a political crisis fuelled with heated legal 
arguments. In particular, solidarity is pre-empted by Article 125(1) TFEU itself, which 
rules out state bail-outs10 when it says that both the EU and its Member States shall 
not be liable for or assume commitments of central governments. A constitutional 
crisis emerged which suggested Greece’s possible exit from the Eurozone. The 
precarious situation of sovereign debts transformed this crisis into a euro currency 
crisis amid speculations over Greece’s economy. This was the first major test of both 
economic and, foremost, social European integration, which revealed the perils of 
free capital markets, liberalisation, and a single currency based on institutional 
foundations which were not capable of sharing the economic costs of major economic 
imbalances. In the absence of a fiscal union, the Founding Treaties proposed an 
Economic and Monetary Union subject to strict convergence criteria, which will be 
analysed in Section V.  
                                                 
8
 In 1999 several MS attempted to stabilise their exchange rates through the Exchange Rate 
Mechanism, see generally P Arestis and M Sawyer, ‘Can the Euro Survive after the European Crisis?’ in 
Arestis and Sawyer (eds), The Euro Crisis (Basingstoke, Palgrave Macmillian, 2012). 
9
 E Chiti and PG Teixeira, ‘The Constitutional Implications of the European Responses to the Financial 
and Public Debt Crisis’ (2013) 50 Common Market Law Review 686; Guttman, n 4 above, 372 reported 
€750 bn.  
10
 M Ruffert, ‘The European Debt Crisis and European Union Law’ (2011) 48 Common Market Law 
Review 1785. 
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In a nutshell, the crisis has highlighted the existing economic disparities in 
terms of economic development across the EU. Thus, some Member States became 
economically and socially responsible for other Member States’ inefficiency. Likewise, 
the financialisation of capital services worldwide has triggered the responsibility of 
various economic actors, institutions, and the wider society. It has raised the question 
of who is primarily responsible for the crisis. This is not easy to answer either before 
or after judging the roots of the crisis, which follows in the next section. 
III. ON THE ROOTS OF THE CRISIS: WHAT WENT WRONG? 
The vast literature on the economic crisis abounds in suggestions of what went wrong 
before and after the crisis. Thus failures appear first as poor economic governance 
because the state employs ineffective means of correlating and/or correcting 
macroeconomic indicators which later affect individual decision-making. For example, 
some of the convergence criteria which Member States are required to fulfil prior to 
joining the Eurozone emerge first as economic indicators which went wrong, such as 
public deficit and spending, GDP, or interest rates. Valdez and Molyneux11 have 
identified the following major macroeconomic imbalances: (i) large and persistent 
current account deficits following previous surpluses due to capital flows from 
emerging to rich industrial economies; (ii) a long period of low real interest rates 
fuelled by deflationary concerns; (iii) a credit boom for home mortgage lending which 
put up the housing prices before the crisis by more than 30 per cent; (iv) low interest 
rates that encouraged consumer spending and persuaded banks to take on more risk 
in various long-term contracts.  
Among the leading variables indicating a financial crisis are rising defaults and 
government deficits, the rapid growth of credit and money supply, declining GDP 
etc.12 This simplified picture has to be explored in greater depth to identify what went 
                                                 
11
 See n 1 above. 
12
 E Tymoigne, ‘Financial fragility’ in J Toporowski and J Michell (eds), Handbook of Critical Issues in 
Finance (Cheltenham, Edward Elgar, 2012) 102. 
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wrong with private and public actors, including Member States, law in action, policy-
makers, and policy influencers.13 
(i) What went wrong with public economic actors? Access to credit was easy, with too 
much money made available through a lax monetary policy, ie lowering interest rates. 
Through the transformation of investment banks into holding companies the shadow 
banking system acquired access to governmental funding.14 Finally, banks which took 
high risks were bailed out and this encouraged them to indulge in more risk-taking.  
(ii) What went wrong with private economic actors? Individual economic actors 
(consumers, borrowers, lenders) underestimated the economic cost and engaged in 
highly speculative contracts (eg variable mortgage rates, and loan insurance 
contracts).15 In other words, consumers failed to be aware of risks to themselves and 
soon, complexity was mistaken for sophistication, with consumers assuming that their 
investments were safe. Corporate managers also failed to evaluate risks before 
entering into complex transactions, such as securitisation and credit default swaps, 
which will be detailed in Section VII. 
In sum, the collective solidarity of banks had been oriented towards hazardous 
risk-taking,16 market indiscipline, and market abuse. Managers increased returns by 
boosting excessive leverage, ie, the return on equity as the major indicator of a firm’s 
performance.17 In essence, the ownership of capital was financed by debts.18 The net 
income generated to shareholders created the bonus culture, while compensation 
schemes encouraged short-run risk-taking. 
                                                 
13
 For existing classifications see, eg, RM Lastra and GE Wood, ‘The Crisis of 2007-2009: Nature, Causes, 
and Reactions’ (2010) 13 Journal of International Economic Law 531; 537; L Garicano and R Lastra, 
‘Towards a New Architecture for Financial Stability: Seven Principles’ (2010) 13 Journal of International 
Economic Law 597. 
14
 E Avgouleas, ‘The global financial crisis, behavioural finance and financial regulation: in search of a 
new orthodoxy’ (2009) 9 Journal of Corporate Law Studies 121. The US abolished the Glass-Steagall Act 
1933. On information asymmetries and ‘moral’ hazard problems see, eg, O Kessler and B Wilhelm, 
‘Financialization and the Three Utopias of Shadow Banking’ (2013) 17 Comp and Change 251; on 
government failure, see ME Stucke, ‘Lessons from the Financial Crisis’ (2011) 77 Antitrust Law Journal 
314. 
15
 F Möslein, ‘The focus of regulatory reforms in Europe after the global financial crisis: from corporate 
to contract governance’ in W Sun, J Stewart and D Pollard (eds), Corporate Governance and the Global 
Financial Crisis: International Perspectives (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2011) 286. 
16
 Banks and firms were taking on extensive risk; therefore, managers were given incentives so as to 
generate higher returns for shareholders. On collective moral hazard see, eg, E Farhi and J Tirole, 
‘Collective Moral Hazard, Maturity Mismatch and Systemic Bailouts’ (2012) 102 American Economics 
Review 60. 
17
 The 2009 Report of the OECD Steering Group on Corporate Governance (24 February 2010) identified 
excessive remuneration, risk management, board practices and the exercise of shareholder rights as 
main problematic areas of corporate governance. 
18
 Profits had to be paid to bond holders and other creditors plus a competitive return to equity owners 
see, eg, Kregel, ‘Political Economy Approaches to Financial Crisis: Hyman Minsky’s Financial Fragility 
Hypothesis’ in Sun et al (eds), Corporate Governance and the Global Financial Crisis n 15 above, 237. 
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(iii) What went wrong with policy? Macroeconomic policy registered numerous 
failures through relaxed credit, followed by an industrial restructuring of banks 
through the application of the TBTF doctrine of state intervention in the economy. 
The lack of regulation in the banking sector – including investment, insurance, 
securities, and lending19 – combined with a less interventionist approach to mergers 
of large financial institutions, meant that these became TBTF and ‘Too-Big-to-
Supervise’.20 As banks were allowed to merge, they escaped competition scrutiny21 
but were encouraged to compete. The latter aspect exacerbated risk-taking through 
improper disclosure requirements put in place to uncover banks’ speculative 
pursuits.22 In 2012, the EC finally activated its competition policy, which helped to 
block a mega-merger between Deusche Börse and the New York Stock Exchange23 in 
the market for financial derivatives. Many believed that the unaccomplished 
economic, monetary, and fiscal integration of Member States was another culprit, as 
was the absence of a central authority dealing with the crisis. 
(iv) What went wrong with law in action? There was inadequate regulation of special 
contracts in the banking, financial and securities sector; an excessive use of 
securitisation as a financial innovation to engineer debts ‘cleansing’; excessive 
sophistication of commercial contracts;24 and a lack of codes of honest business 
practice or models of contracts in place for consumers.25 As banks became 
increasingly sophisticated, their innovative products were not priced accurately. It 
was impossible to assess the hazard due to innovative securitised products. In this 
context, ‘soft’ law26 used in the framework of state aid policy, turned competition law 
into a major tool for the restructuring of the banking industry.  
                                                 
19
 See for the US JW Markham, ‘Lessons for Competition Law from the Economic Crisis: The Prospect 
for Antitrust Responses to the “Too-Big-to-Fail” Phenomenon’ (2011) 16 Fordham Journal of Corporate 
& Financial Law 263. 
20
 Stucke, n 14 above, 319; on rising bank concentration see, eg, FM Scherer, ‘Financial Mergers and 
their Consequences’, Harvard Kennedy School of Government Research Working Paper 19/2013. 
21
 See, eg, D Zimmer and L Rengier, ‘Entflechtung, Fusionskontrolle oder Sonderregulierung für 
systemrelevante Banken? Ansätze zur Lösung des “Too-big-to-fail” Problems’ (2010) 8 Zeitschrift für 
Wettbewerbsrecht 105, who proposed a specific merger control, including a ‘decartelisation’ of banks. 
22
 X Vives, ‘Competition policy in banking’ (2011) Oxford Review of Economic Policy 27, 487. 
23
 COMP/M6166 Deutsche Börse/NYSE Euronext [2011] OJ C199. 
24
 L Buchheit, ‘We Made it Too Complicated’ (2008) 27 International Financial Law Review 24, who 
highlighted the complexity of modern financial instruments as the ‘big culprit’ of the crisis. 
25
 C Brummer, Soft Law and the Global Financial System: Rule Making in the 21st Century (Cambridge, 
Cambridge University Press, 2012) 223. 
26
 C Brummer, ‘Why Soft Law Dominates International Finance-And Not Trade’ (2010) 13 Journal of 
International Economic Law 623; retrospectively see, eg, AF Lowenfeld, ‘The International Monetary 
System: A Look Back Over Seven Decades’ (2010) 13 Journal of International Economic Law 575; JP 
Trachtman, ‘The International Law of Financial Crisis: Spillovers, Subsidiarity, Fragmentation and 
Cooperation’ (2010) 13 Journal of International Economic Law 719; G Hufbauer and DD Xie, ‘Financial 
Stability and Monetary Policy: Need for International Surveillance’ (2010) 13 Journal of International 
Economic Law 939. 
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(v) What went wrong with EU institutions? As regards institutional responses to the 
crisis, on 12 November 2008, the EC proposed tighter rules for credit rating agencies; 
on 29 April 2009, it presented a draft directive on hedge funds and private equity;27 
on 23 September 2009, the EC proposed a legislative package for EU financial macro-
supervision28 (Systemic Risk Board) and micro-prudential supervision (Banking 
Authority, Securities and Market Authority, and Insurance and Occupational Pensions 
Authority); in October 2010, the EC discussed a tax on financial transactions; in March 
2011, it drafted rules on mortgage lending. Finally, in June 2011, the EC unveiled 
million-euro fines for rule-breaking bankers.  
(vi) What went wrong with influencing views? This refers to the views of leading 
academic and economic experts who influenced policy-making and on whom policy-
makers later relied to reshape economic and social governance and/or manage the 
crisis. There was a fervent reliance on faulty neo-classical economic theories29 and 
liberal ideologies,30 an over-reliance on mathematical risk models which failed to 
adequately predict and mitigate corporate risk,31 and scientific interpretations.32 
(vii) A knock-on effect of the limits of knowledge? This is attributed to the narrow 
focus of competition law33 and the lack of interdisciplinary understanding, not only of 
law with other sciences, such as economics or sociology,34 but among different areas 
of law like competition, contract, finance, banking and corporate law.35 This led 
Westbrook to explain: 
[D]erivatives are contracts; corporations … are creatures of law. Economics, 
however, has always aspired to be a natural science, and so has considered the 
social as if it were natural. This fundamental ontological error has led to 
                                                 
27
 Source: EurActiv, ‘Financial Regulation: The EU’s agenda’, 1 April 2009, available at: 
http:www.euractiv.com/euro-finance-regulation-eus-agenda-linksdossier-188497. 
28
 Critically on the Basel Committee’s ‘Core Principles for Effective Banking Supervision’, see Brummer, 
n 26 above, 225. 
29
 ME Stucke, ‘Teaching Antitrust After the Financial Crisis’ (2013) 8 Journal of Business & Technology 
Law 209, suggesting that behavioural economics is now ‘mainstream’; J Crotty, ‘The Realism of 
Assumptions does Matter: Why Keynes-Minsky Theory Must Replace Efficient Market Theory as the 
Guide to Financial Regulation Policy’ in Wolfson and Epstein (eds), n 2 above, 134. 
30
 See RA Posner, A Failure of Capitalism: The Crisis of ’08 and the Descent into Depression (Cambridge 
MA, Harvard University Press, 2009) 235. Posner identified one of the causes of the crisis as laissez-
faire liberalism.  
31
 F Akinbami, ‘Is meta-regulation all it’s cracked up to be? The case of UK financial regulation’ (2013) 
14 Journal of Banking Regulation 16, 20. 
32
 Especially trust in the superiority of mathematics, game theory and modelling over rigorous 
disciplines such as law, political science, psychology, sociology and history.   
33
 Markham, n 19 above, 265. 
34
 See the insightful contributions of I Lianos, ‘Judging’ Economists: Economic Expertise in Competition 
Law Litigation: A European View’ in I Kokkoris and I Lianos (eds), The Reform of EC Competition Law: 
New Challenges (Kluwer Law International, 2010) 185; I Lianos and C Genakos, ‘Econometric Evidence 
in EU Competition Law: An Empirical and Theoretical Analysis’ CLES Research Paper 06/2012. 
35
 See, eg, T Cottier, ‘Challenges Ahead in International Economic Law’ (2009) 12 Journal of 
International Economic Law 3, on the failures of a ‘strictly disciplinary tradition’ of fragmentation and 
specialisation. 
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fanciful pricing models, as if we could model the movements of legal 
instruments like we model the movements of the stars.36  
In other words, the practical inability of macroeconomics to test its predictions 
empirically has played a major role in this crisis.37 Statistics and the reliance on 
macroeconomic models by central banks have proven to be useful. For example, 
econometrics has demonstrated how a series of macroeconomic measures, 
specifically those targeting active employment policies, impact upon individuals. 
Nevertheless, these tools remain limited and have proven to be grossly inadequate in 
practice.38  
What conclusions can be drawn from the above? It is necessary to identify 
both the plethora of causes which have contributed to this crisis and the means of 
correcting the resulting negative effects. A preliminary balance of these causes would 
include the institutional problems of leading public authorities – which ought to have 
prevented and managed the crisis (eg governments, regulators) – the legal problems 
regarding the economics of special contracts which imply a speculative risk and the 
application of non-interventionist competition supervision at a microeconomic level. 
Furthermore, an inadequate macro-supervision of shadow banking, and the influence 
of schools of economics/economists on crisis management also played an important 
role. Given the complexity of this crisis, it is difficult to identify one major root of the 
crisis; rather, multiple causes have led to major negative events.  
As it is possible that a certain cause is the effect and vice versa, the first 
scenario is pitched at a microeconomic level. The next section aims to investigate 
what has happened in the subprime mortgage lending market and then goes on to 
question the perceived influence of certain schools of economics/economists to verify 
their plausibility if applied to the current crisis. The following problem–question 
scenario builds upon all of the above insights into the roots of the crisis. 
                                                 
36
 D Westbrook, Out of Crisis: Rethinking our Financial Markets (Boulder CO, Paradigm Publishing, 
2009). 
37
 G Kirchgässner, ‘Die Krise der Wirtschaft: Auch eine Krise der Wirtschaftwissenschaften?’ (2009) 10 
Perspektiven der Wirtschaftspolitik 447, 452: ‘Dies ist ein Preis, den wir dafür zahlen müssen, dass wir 
zumindest im Bereich der Makroökonomik – keine experimentelle Wissenschaft sind: 
makroökonomische Experimente sind nie kontrolliert and sollten auch sehr zurückhaltend eingesetzt 
werden, da sie dann, wenn sie schief gehen, enorme gesellschaftliche Kosten haben können’. Thus one 
can disagree with the last paragraph since macroeconomic policies have always been tested on 
mankind and citizens have paid the social and economic costs of policy failure. 
38
 Ibid. 
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IV. ON THE INTERPLAY OF MICRO- WITH MACROECONOMICS IN THE SUBPRIME39 
MORTGAGE LENDING MARKET 
At a microeconomic level, consumers borrowed more on terms which were 
favourable in the short term, but the long-term effect was building up a bubble due to 
a lack of economic foresight and human irrationality. A variable interest rate 
inducement coupled with myopia over any eventual job loss reveals an 
unconscionable moral hazard. It is believed that banks intentionally exploited 
consumers by taking advantage of their well-known decision-making biases,40 namely, 
a tendency to ignore the long-term costs of complex transactions, while opting for a 
variable interest rate, or a limited experience with commercial transactions.41 The 
relevance of consumer law here is the potential to find the behavioural exploitation of 
consumers as a form of deceptive conduct, such as a lender’s omission of terms and 
conditions. It is a well-established principle that offering incomplete information to 
consumers about the costs of their transaction, through false statements or 
omissions, will give rise to contractual misrepresentation, which, in turn, if it is based 
on intentional behaviour, becomes fraudulent.42 
Unfortunately, the existing consumer protection and available remedies have 
not been adequate tools for antitrust intervention due to an artificial separation of 
the consumer from competition laws.43 The drawback is therefore leaving behavioural 
economics to consumer protection laws which address information asymmetries for 
borrowers who are being misled through lenders’ business marketing strategies. 
Reliable credit information is believed to correct information asymmetries44 through 
an effective credit reporting mechanism. Recently, the hypothesis that lenders are 
                                                 
39
 Posner, n 30 above, 23 suggested ‘subprime’ as a euphemism for mortgage loans to people at high 
risk of default. 
40
 See also F Akinbami, ‘Retail Products and the Global Financial Crisis’, available on SSRN. 
41
 M Huffman and D Heidtke, ‘Behavioural Exploitation Antitrust in Consumer Subprime Mortgage 
Lending’ (2012) 3 William & Mary Policy Review 77, available on SSRN. 
42
 For a disposition to fraud, see MR Darby and E Karni, ‘Free competition and the optimal amount of 
fraud’ (1973) 16 Journal of Law and Economics 67; F Akinbami, ‘Financial services and consumer 
protection after the crisis’ (2011) 29 International Journal of Bank Marketing 134, 137. 
43
 See especially NW Averitt and R Lande, ‘Using the “Consumer Choice” Approach to Antitrust Law’ 
(2007) 74 Antitrust Law Journal 175; A Albors-Llorens, ‘Competition and Consumer Law in the EU: 
Evolution and Convergence’ (2014) 33 Yearbook of European Law 1. 
44
 A Padilla and M Pagano, ‘Sharing default information as a borrower discipline device’ (2000) 44 
European Economic Review 1951–80. 
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more likely to share credit information when entry barriers are high and the threat of 
competition is low has been rejected empirically due to burdensome administrative 
costs.45 Banks with larger market shares earn higher monopoly rents on their 
borrower information than do banks with a smaller market share. Furthermore, 
higher entry barriers are associated with lower transparency in credit reporting.46 
The above picture needs to further explore the macroeconomic level. Hayek’s 
theory of trade cycle is worth highlighting. He argued that interest rates below the 
‘natural’ rate lead banks to expand their lending in a manner which is unsustainable.47 
This, in turn, leads inevitably to a crisis, since businesses are misled into believing that 
more resources are available than is really the case.48 According to his theory, it is 
then government action or misinformation by the central bank which ‘awakes’ the 
crisis through the banking system. In essence, the past reaction to such governmental 
stimulus was an impulsive entrepreneurial spirit towards excessive lending with 
dramatic effects on the real economy. Banks were attracted to subprime mortgage 
lending by higher interest rates of 2 per cent above fixed prime lending.49 For 
consumers, mortgage financing became attractive; for example, a buyer could pay 
£350,000 with a 90 per cent mortgage, and three years later, the house price had 
increased to £500,000. 
A serious analysis of the cause–effect–result phenomenon shows that but for 
the low interest rates, consumers would not have mortgaged, bankers would not 
have assumed risky lending, and everybody would have been happy. The shortcoming 
of the cause–effect platitude is that it is precisely the inherent risk and its hazardous 
multiplication that is the real cause which has resulted in the default bubble. Since the 
maintenance of a low interest rate is a macroeconomic state policy, one could argue 
that it was the widespread reliance on this policy which created this mess. The 
                                                 
45
 M Bruhn, S Farazi and M Kanz, ‘Bank Competition, Concentration, and Credit Reporting’, The World 
Bank Development Research Group, Finance and Private Sector Development Team, Policy Research 
Working Paper 64422/2013, 5. 
46
 Ibid, 16. 
47
 FA Hayek, Prices and Production (London, Routledge, 1931). 
48
 RCB Miller, ‘The Austrians and the Crisis’ (2009) 29 Economic Affairs 27, 28. 
49
 On the existing link between the use of aggressive mortgage lending and house price volatility see, 
eg, A Pavlov and S Wachter, ‘Subprime Lending and House Price Volatility’, University of Pennsylvania 
Institute for Law and Economics Research Paper no 08/2008. 
 13 
interest-rate-effect in macroeconomics postulates that a rising price level pushes up 
the interest rate, which in turn, lowers consumption and new investments in plant 
and equipment.50 
 In conclusion, it would be naive to assume that a mortgage multiplier could 
eventually create a crisis of such proportions. There are other trading exchanges 
which operated much in the same way or even worse and which will be explained in 
Section VII. In contrast, others have argued that under the influence of neoliberalism, 
the economy ‘benefited’ from an explosion of public and private credit.51 
Another belief is that a recession is able to destructively correct the errors of a 
boom. In other words, bad businesses will collapse, which explains the rescue 
mechanisms put in place by the EC. In contrast to the previous credit boom period, 
interest rates have to be higher to collect through deposit savings the monies needed 
for the liquidity of banks which are due to collapse. This view has been contradicted 
more recently, because the liquidity problems were created ‘by the unexpected 
decline in the value of financial assets and by the consequent reduction of inter-bank 
lending’.52 
The level of interest rates is said to depend upon the depth of the recession.53 
Anecdotal evidence of the promised triple-dip recession proves how interest rates for 
savings have not been tripled, much to our own economic loss. In contrast, Member 
States were able to borrow at historically low interest rates.54 Following the Austrian 
School of Economics’ advice, Member States failed to raise interest rates 
significantly.55 Rather, the EU simulated a destructive recession and restructured 
banks through recapitalisation, the difference this time being that the resources 
which allowed this to happen have flown directly from EU taxpayers to hazardous 
risk-takers. Nevertheless, irrespective of whether the process of restructuring itself 
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should not have been implemented effectively, the real worry turns on whether this 
sacrifice is actually worth anything? 
Furthermore, the reverse of not encouraging government spending for fear of 
any taxation mismatch or of a pervasive inflationist course seems equally odd, as it 
results in austerity, which promotes job cuts and raises unemployment levels. 
Unfortunately, the austerity obsession has delivered economic failure, social poverty, 
migration and unprecedented levels of unemployment. This will be documented in 
Section V. Now, to return to Hayek’s prescription of ‘flexible’ wages, ie, cutting wages 
to minimise unemployment and combat inflation, the latter being currently low at 1.7 
per cent, it is worth revealing that global population56 is more than three times higher 
than 1.8 billion, as it was in the 1920s. This makes one particularly circumspect of 
creative ideas of ‘full’ employment in real terms57 as applied to a different historical 
level in society’s development. In the EU, the last total population revealed by 
Eurostat in 2012 was 503.7 million, not counting 4.2 million Croatians. As nearly 26.2 
million unemployed citizens account for 10.8 per cent of the active work force, it 
means that we have an active population of 235.8 million but only 212.22 million 
employed citizens. 
In conclusion, the EU has just 41.7 per cent of its total population in full 
employment. This dramatic unemployment situation comes just after what we could 
call a Failed Financialisation of Big Banks, and proves that what Stiglitz has already 
suggested about macroeconomic multipliers is true,58 namely that, assessed 
retrospectively, the process of EU restructuring of banks, with its overly generous 
stimulus package, has failed to generate either jobs or any extra GDP.59 Fortunately, 
the EU unemployment rate does not exceed the 200 million estimate of the 
International Labour Organization as a global crisis unemployment figure.60 Finally, 
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macroeconomics suggests that only an unemployment rate of 20 per cent triggers a 
depression.61 
Another cause of the fragile growth lies in the more restrictive and austere 
macroeconomic policies that are necessary to achieve the economic and monetary 
union.62 Nevertheless, Austrian economics offer one excellent tip: if undertaken, bank 
recapitalisation and state control is most likely to be unsuccessful. This is true in the 
EU when one confronts the bleak industry predictions available so far and the high 
unemployment rate.  
It is argued here that Stiglitz’s assertion that the rejection of the Keynesian 
theory of employment63 – which promoted rigid wages – 64 formed the basis of the 
many post-Keynesian doctrines and undermined job protection and labour rights65 
was accurate. In macroeconomics, a 5 per cent unemployment rate means that the 
economy attains full employment.66 The misconstruction of employment theory, with 
a strong emphasis on its ‘utopian’ vision of full employment, can be justified by the 
distrust of wage competition, which even if it could achieve labour flexibility, does so 
at the expense of worsening workers’ conditions. According to Keynes, lowering 
wages would lower workers’ incomes and reduce further spending on goods.67 This 
makes Keynesian theory socially human. Thus Keynes believed that capitalism has a 
natural tendency to cut employment68 but falling interest rates, prices, and wages are 
insufficient to stimulate investment and consumption69 as a way out of the 
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recession.70 In other words, without government intervention, the economy does not 
move toward full employment.  
Unfortunately many Keynesian policies implemented in the 1950s and 1960s 
were inappropriately addressing deflation after it had ceased to represent a major 
threat.71 Therefore, Minsky’s financial fragility theory postulated that the trade cycle 
reacts to endogenous shocks, such as a change in monetary policy by the central bank 
(eg increasing interest rates to slow the economy for fear of inflation, or a supra-
production crisis where markets are saturated with cars, electronics etc)72 and that a 
deficient aggregate demand triggers a stagnant unemployment situation, which could 
eventually attain Keynesian full employment through monetary and fiscal policy.73 If 
nothing else works, another option suggested by Austrian economics is to promote 
competition in currency exchange. Obviously, this did not work well for the Eurozone 
countries, which could not devalue their national currencies.74 
Finally, as a last resort, tax is viewed with much scepticism.75 Granting 
temporary facilities to individuals contributes to raising the level of savings deposits, 
which, in turn, actively stimulates consumption. However, direct tax helps little if it 
targets only those consumer goods that are to be produced in the long run and 
imports. Since 50 per cent of the lower taxed goods account for only 2.8 per cent of 
revenues, while the upper 5 per cent account for 63.5 per cent, and because the 
marginal consumption rate falls as earnings increase, then adjusting the private 
consumption deficit through direct taxation is thus possible for the category of lower 
income taxation. As government spending was feared to become inflationary,76 
spending has remained static, whereas taxation has served to increase reliance on 
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consumption taxes, such as VAT and payroll taxes, and to diminish corporate tax.77 In 
conclusion, trying to fix a crisis through taxation is nothing but a vicious circle. 
In conclusion, all these insights reveal how unhelpful economic policies or 
economists’ predictions78 are; how the crisis has destroyed them one after another, 
thereby shaking our society in the search for social justice, the rule of law, and a new 
order; and how this crisis managed to exacerbate its social and economic costs 
instead of fixing the economy. 
V. ON THE MACROECONOMICS OF THE EURO CRISIS 
Before looking to the current economic outlook, it is useful to re-call the 
macroeconomic legal framework which has been instrumental for setting out the 
overall performance criteria in the EU. Article 119(2) TFEU refers to a single currency, 
namely the euro, monetary policy, and exchange-rate policy. Its primary objective is 
to maintain price stability and to support the general economic policies in the Union, 
in accordance with the ‘principle of an open market economy with free competition’. 
This principle means that at a microeconomic level, free competition will be 
complemented by macroeconomic policy. The primary objective of price stability is 
also mentioned under Article 105 of the Protocol on the European System of Central 
Banks (ESCB). According to Article 119(3), macroeconomic policy shall comply with 
the following guiding principles: stable prices, sound public finances and monetary 
conditions, and a sustainable balance of payments. Article 140(1) TFEU sets out the 
Maastricht convergence criteria for the accession of Member States to the single 
currency. Unfortunately, these nominal terms are tight. They mandate that the EC 
and the ECB report to the Council on the progress made by the Member States 
regarding the achievement of economic and monetary union, with a view to the 
achievement of a high degree of sustainable convergence. The economic criteria refer 
respectively to the ‘achievement, sustainability, observance and durability’ of: 
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(i) a high degree of price stability, by looking at the inflation rate of the three best 
performing Member States;79  
(ii) the sustainability of the government financial position, by looking at the public 
deficit;  
(iii) normal fluctuation margins provided for by the exchange-rate mechanism without 
devaluing against the euro;  
(iv) convergence achieved by the Member States with derogation and its participation 
in the exchange-rate mechanism being reflected in the long-term interest-rate levels. 
In conclusion, the above criteria refer to various nominal values, such as an 
inflation lower than 1.5 per cent; exchange rates within the range of 15 per cent; 
long-term interest rates no more than 2 per cent higher than the arithmetic coverage 
of the similar 10-year government bond yields in the three Member States with the 
lowest HICP inflation; a budgetary deficit lower than 3 per cent GDP; and a 
government public debt criterion lower than 60 per cent. While these criteria aim to 
establish financial responsibility, they fail to include unemployment targets. Only in 
the last paragraph of Article 140 TFEU, is it spelled out that the monitoring reports 
‘shall also take account of … an examination of the development of unit labour costs 
and other price indices’. 
Current Economic Outlook 
 EU Real GDP Growth     -4.2% (2009)          0.1% (2013) 
 EU Unemployment          9.6% (2010)       10.8% (12% euro area) (2014) 
 EU Government debt     78.7% (2009)      86.8% (92.7% euro area) (2014) 
highest in Greece 171.8%, Italy 132.9% and Portugal 128.7% 
Source: Eurostat80 
The current economic situation reveals interesting insights into the state of 
the economy. Inflation has generally been higher than 2 per cent. According to the 
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latest Eurostat figures,81 the annual inflation rate in the Eurozone area was 1.6 per 
cent in July 2013 compared to 2.4 per cent a year earlier. The annual inflation rate in 
the EU was 1.7 per cent in July 2013.82 Therefore, a country with a relatively low 
(high) inflation rate has a relatively high (low) real interest rate. However, monetary 
policy has been operated in a perverse manner, with low real rates being applied 
where inflation is relatively high. This contradicts the presumption that high inflation 
is met by high real rates of interest to dampen demand. Many economists agree that 
compared with the Bank of England and the US Federal Reserve, which have reduced 
aggressive interest rates, the ECB has adopted a stricter approach. In April 2011, 
interest rates reached 1.25 per cent. Apart from the existing large current account 
imbalances between the EMU Member States, there are also substantial differences 
in terms of changes in unit labour costs. 
Again, unemployment rose to 26.2 million in January 2013, which accounts for 
10.8 per cent of the active population83 and 11.9 per cent of the active population in 
the euro area (19 million). Furthermore, long-term unemployment reached another 
historical high84 in the third quarter at 11.2 million, which is 86 per cent higher than 
four years earlier. Another aspect worth highlighting is that youth unemployment 
reached its peak in January 2013 with 23.6 per cent of active youths.85 Immigration 
was 20.7 million in January 2012 and migration was 13.6 million.86 In addition, 25.7 
per cent of people aged between 55 and 64 were living in poverty and social 
exclusion,87 while the lowest average monthly salary was just 393 euros (Bulgaria).88 
In 24 Member States, the likelihood of finding a job was lower in the third quarter of 
2012 than four years before.89 And this is not all. Major planned cuts in the industry 
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sectors cast rather a bleak shadow over the overall economy. For example, in the 
banking sector, Commerzbank is implementing a global restructuring plan targeting 
between 4000 and 6000 job losses by 2016; in the airline sector, Iberia is cutting 19 
per cent of its entire workforce (3807 employees) and Air Berlin another 900 by 
2014,90 while the manufacturing sector lost 36,964 jobs last year, and financial 
intermediation 19,585. The worst prognosis is in the construction industry, and 
wholesale and retail trade as a result of significant reductions in terms of output, 
added value, and employment.91  
A. The ‘Efficiency’ Justification against Bail-outs of Inefficient Banks or States 
So how was it then legally possible to instrument the bail-outs of banks? Article 119 
TFEU makes it clear that the adoption of an economic policy which is based on the 
‘close coordination’ of Member States’ economic policies has to be in accordance 
with the principle of an open market economy with free competition. It must be 
added that competition law rarely accepts a failing-firm-defence on the grounds of its 
poor economic performance, that is, inefficiency. In this respect Article 120 TFEU 
mandates that economic policies ought to follow the same principle, ‘favouring an 
efficient allocation of resources’. Furthermore, Article 123(1) TFEU contains an 
imperative prohibition of 
[o]verdraft facilities or any other type of credit facility with the European 
Central Bank or with the central banks of the Member States … in favour of 
Union institutions, bodies, offices or agencies, central governments, regional, 
local or other public authorities, other bodies governed by public law, or public 
undertakings of Member States, 
as well as ‘the purchase directly from them by the European Central Bank or national 
central banks of debt instruments’. One cannot possibly comment more on the legally 
binding hierarchy and ‘constitutional’ ranking of the above provisions, which clearly 
eliminate the possibility of granting bailouts on the basis of inefficiency, be it at state 
or TBTF level, without basically undermining the rule of law and transforming the 
spirit of free competition into coercive freedom, the meaning of which will be 
revealed in the end Section IX. 
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Another critical argument is that competition intervention in favour of TBTF 
banks has been implemented through substantial crisis communication in the form of 
soft law. It has been argued elsewhere that state aid communications bear no legally 
binding force.92 Thus, they are administrative provisions which offer guidance on how 
to deal with the restructuring or capitalisation of banks. Therefore, a higher 
hierarchical and constitutionally accepted rescue provision is Article 107(3)(b) TFEU 
on state aid to ‘remedy a serious disturbance in the economy of a Member State’. 
This has closed the academic debate over the primacy of ‘hard’ over ‘soft’ law.93 The 
latter could be called an administrative measure which has binding force. No legal act 
or decision whatsoever would otherwise be enacted if it were to be disregarded. 
Furthermore, if it were legally valid that soft law communications are not binding on 
EU courts, this would be instrumental, on the one hand, for states to claim 
disgorgement of profits for cashed bail-outs of banks engaged in fraudulent pursuits 
and, on the other hand, for EU citizens to claim fair compensation through taxation. It 
would be legitimate for them to pay lower taxes until the almost 40 per cent of the 
GDP in bail-outs was credited on their payroll accounts. 
In conclusion, the apparent legitimacy of state bail-outs is in the treaty; the 
implementation of banks bailouts is in administrative law communications. 
VI. ON THE SOCIAL COSTS OF THE CRISIS 
After the apparent legitimacy has just been discussed above, it is worth checking the 
actual economic cost involved in bail-outs. This begs the following question: how 
much state aid was really needed and why? Insights into how state aid gradually 
progressed reveal that between 2002 and 2007, the amount of state aid decreased by 
2 per cent annually and ranged within 0.5 per cent of the GDP,94 followed in 2008 by a 
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nearly four-fold increase to 2.2 per cent of the GDP. Between 2008 and 2009, the 
figure of €3.632 billion, the equivalent of 29 per cent GDP, signalled an alarming shift 
of perspective when everybody started to see red. Even ad hoc state aid in favour of 
individual financial institutions amounted to €587 billion (9 per cent GDP).95 Germany, 
the UK and France, which make up 60 per cent of the EU banking sector, received 60 
per cent of the total amount of state aid granted.96 A total of 215 financial institutions 
received some form of aid, but 114 received toxic asset support relief.97 Between 
2008 and 2011, the EC approved a shocking €4.5 trillion of state aid, that is, nearly 
36.7 per cent of the GDP.98 This makes the entire GDP worth €12.26 trillion.99 Minus 
the bail-outs, the remaining €7.76 trillion was nearly approaching another Great 
Depression as macroeconomics suggests that at extremely low levels of real GDP, 
when output is €3 trillion, the economy is in a depression.100 
The economic costs estimated for the UK economy post-intervention amount 
to nearly £40 billion of lost output.101 Other macroeconomic crisis mechanisms, such 
as the Stabilisation Mechanism, allow the EC to raise up to €60 billion as financial 
assistance to Member States experiencing financial difficulties. The Financial Stability 
Facility has been set up to issue debt securities guarantees of up to €444 billion.102 
Therefore it does not make us feel any better to know that in 2009, the US bail-out 
amounted to US$8 trillion,103 that is $30,000 per citizen, $650 billion of GDP income, 
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5.5 million jobs etc.104 Recent figures contradict a 2009 estimate by the International 
Monetary Fund of US$11.9 trillion as the total cost of the global crisis.105 
It is by no means controversial to say that banks were being favoured before 
the current crisis hit. Banks were immune from competition intervention and allowed 
to merge, which is another fact that is statistically documented. Between 1997 and 
2007, the number of EU banks declined by 29 per cent compared to 22 per cent in the 
US.106 Bank concentration levels remain relatively high post-crisis, while recent 
research contradicts the economic assumption that concentration levels should 
necessarily translate into high market shares.107 Against the shortcoming of immunity 
to competition agency scrutiny,108 it does not follow that banks did not compete 
against each other. Another telling fact is that it is precisely tougher competition that 
has increased the risk-taking incentives of banks and pushed them to pursue risky 
portfolios.109 Shareholders have designed compensation contracts to insure managers 
against failure and incentivise risk-taking. Therefore, keeping this numeracy exercise 
in mind is essential when questioning how state aid has been spent on banks which 
will be detailed next. 
A. Main Categories of Crisis State Aid 
So far the EU has offered €2,738 billion in guarantee schemes, €231 billion in the form 
of recapitalisation, and €76 billion in liquidity measures and asset relief. The first €26 
billion bail-out went to the German IKB and Sachsen LB, which had been exposed to 
asset-backed securities in the US subprime market. This was followed by the UK bail-
out of Northern Rock, late 2007 and early 2008. Northern Rock (fifth largest mortgage 
bank with a 9.7 per cent market share)110 received £20 billion in a guarantee scheme 
and £25 billion liquidity facility from the Bank of England. There is disagreement over 
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whether Northern Rock was a systemically important bank, since it did not trigger 
problems elsewhere in the banking system.111 While the intervention did not allow 
this to happen, it created a UK precedent of intervention on the basis of TBTF. It is 
useful to recall here that the ECB identified some 46 systemically important banks 
which account for 68 per cent of EU banking.112 This can only be the result of allowing 
mega-mergers to go ahead113 and the monopoly power of banks on business 
lending.114 
WestLB, Fortis and Dexia followed. The Irish Daily offered €400 billion as a 
guarantee scheme to cover retail, commercial, and interbank deposits. Royal Bank of 
Scotland received £45 billion to ensure its survival because the bank failed to maintain 
adequate liquidity and was involved in a risky financial strategy.115 
The reaction of the EU Commission to the crisis was to issue an administrative 
act, the Banking communication,116 following which it received notifications for 
guarantee schemes, recapitalisation, and other interventions of up to €2 trillion.117 
This aid was insufficient to restore market confidence as bank balance sheets 
continued to erode. The ECB intervened through liquidity operations. The EC’s 
disagreement with French institutions over ‘preventive recapitalization’ caused alarm 
bells to ring in that there were some serious doubts over whether €10.5 billion118 was, 
indeed, offered to TBTF banks. In this context, the EC issued its Recapitalisation 
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communication,119 which provided guidance on the pricing of capital injections. It 
distinguished between ‘distressed’ and ‘fundamentally sound’ banks.120 The former 
were required to pay higher coupon rates. 
Following German plans to create a series of special purpose vehicles (SPV) 
and a heated debate over assets pricing, the EC issued its Impaired assets 
communication121 to handle toxic assets. Asset relief in the form of asset purchase has 
meant that MS would buy the impaired asset portfolio at a fixed price, but higher 
than the market price. On the basis of toxic asset guarantees, MS have practically 
taken over a share of the default risk and losses.122 The conditions for granting such 
aids required full disclosure of the assets; sharing the cost between MS, shareholders 
and creditors, and coordination among them; and restructuring distressed banks.123 
The German scheme allowed financial institutions to transfer structured securities to 
a SPV for a period of 20 years and bear the full risk of losses. 
Another Restructuring communication124 targeted banks with unsustainable 
business models. Banks were required to demonstrate their own strategies to achieve 
long-term viability without state aid under adverse economic conditions, known as a 
bank ‘stress’ test.125 The restructuring of banks began with Commerzbank,126 which 
was required to divest itself of its investment banking and real estate and accepted a 
short-term ban on acquisitions.127 Other restructured banks included RBS, Lloyds, 
Anglo-Irish Bank, Fortis, Dexia, Bayern LB, HSH Nordbank, IKB, WestLB, ING and ABN 
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Amro. Lloyds TSB/HBOS, as a result of a rescue merger with HBOS,128 received £17 
billion state recapitalisation in 2009,129 with £260 billion of toxic assets temporarily 
insured.130 Lloyds was the second largest bank with 24 per cent market share in gross 
mortgage lending, while HSBC had 13 per cent.131 As a result of its acquisition of 
HBOS, Lloyds and RBS were required to divest a 5 per cent market share to a new 
market entrant and achieve a £181 billion reduction of assets by 31 December 
2014.132 
As Lyons and Zhu have rightfully commented, the above ‘zombie’ banks 
‘withdraw lending as they rebuild their own capital, to the detriment of lending to the 
non-financial sector’,133 thereby contributing to the current recession. Another 
excellent point to make is the need to reform any banking system that ‘privatises’ 
shareholders’ profits and ‘socialises’ losses through bail-outs of inefficient or poor 
economic performance.134 The EU intervention in the banking sector, on the basis of 
its flawed TBTF doctrine of state intervention in the economy, has transferred the 
economic responsibility of inefficient corporations to the social responsibility of 
individual taxpayers.135 
 TBTF Banks136 
 rescue aids: Hypo Real Estate Holding, Commerzbank, WestLB; 
 restructuring: Sachesen LB, IKB, WestLB, Landesbank Baden Württemberg, 
Sparkasse KölnBonn, Hypo Real Estate, HSH Nordbank, NordLB, Bayern LB; 
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 WestLB €3 billion capital injections, €11 billion impaired assets of which €3.4 
billion.137 
 Anglo Irish Bank €29.3 billion 
 Irish Nationwide Building Society (INBS) €5.4 billion; 
 Hypo Real Estate €9.95 billion in capital injections, €145 billion in guarantees 
and €20 billion in asset relief; 
 ING €17 billion 
 Fortis Bank €11.2 billion 
One cannot reflect on the above famous bail-outs without formulating the 
following question: what did these banks have in common? The answer is a very 
fragile funding model supported by a risky loan portfolio and the fact that, in their 
rescue, the EC did not come up with a pertinent ‘counterfactual’138 scenario of what 
would have happened if they had been allowed to fail. Fortis139 is yet another 
example of bank rescue due to excessive risk-taking as a result of its participation in 
the ABN AMRO merger.140 Competition authorities ought to be prudent when 
accepting the failing-firm-defence for under-performing, inefficient, and poorly 
managed firms.141 While Member States may block a merger in order to protect a 
‘legitimate interest’, such as financial stability in the domestic market, the US 
Department of Justice cannot review a merger for systemic risk.142 Thus competition 
authorities have been ill-equipped to assess the systemic risk which eroded the 
legitimacy of the TBTF doctrine of intervention. The latter helped inefficient banks to 
remain ‘viable’ on the market.143 Fortunately, the EC has realised its defective 
implementation since it has later called for a ‘sound’ restructuring plan for banks 
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before capitalisations or taking any other asset protection measures.144 This new 
move follows early indications that the EC is going to ‘toughen’ its state aid to failing 
banks.145 The major criticism of the TBTF doctrine remains, however, its having been 
endorsed by EU policy-makers as a ‘way out’ of the crisis. 
In conclusion, the above developments in administering state aid have 
changed the whole structure of the EU banking sector in a way which has 
substantially departed from the traditional prevention of distortions of competition. 
The next question to ask, therefore, is not whether competition enforcers have not 
been prepared to undertake this mission – because, obviously, they were not – but to 
ask how much state aid has been taken away from the overall prospects of economic 
growth in terms of GDP and weighted against, as mentioned earlier, the rising 
unemployment in the EU and the passing on of social costs through taxation. Finally, 
this revolutionary change of perspective makes competition law and policy the 
scapegoat of a New Banks Deal. Its story of success for banks and failure for citizens 
has been possible on the basis of the Union’s democratic deficits, since its citizens 
have no say in the next election of the President or of the College of Commissioners, 
both of which have been instrumental in matters of competition policy.146 This point 
uncovers an existing institutional crisis; for example, the EC’s plans to create an 
agency to rescue or shut failed banks by 2015 against the significant backdrop of not 
having an EU banking union until January 2014.147 The latter aspect pinpoints the 
politics of the crisis. Recent research suggests that, for a number of reasons, electoral 
competition is likely to constrain the abuse of public resources in the form of bail-
outs.148 This is fully evidenced in the following criticism by a member of Socialists and 
Democrats (Elisa Ferreira) who said: ‘We need to stop casino banking, break the link 
between public finance and failing banks, and ensure sustainable financing of the real 
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economy to encourage growth’. As Wibbels rightfully put it when investigating the 
constitutional dimension of crisis bail-outs,149 the above statement based on 
‘competitive politics’ encourages what one commentator would famously call in 
competition a way of ‘publicly distancing oneself’150 from the culprit of bail-outs. 
Electoral competition should actively discourage zombie banks from looking at the 
welfare state as their lender of last resort. 
Briefly, what this bitter crisis has taught us, so far, is that structural changes 
happen during a crisis whenever state intervention is insufficiently backed up by 
constitutional and institutional safeguarding mechanisms, since it is easier to abuse 
the rule of law on the basis of predicted, imminent economic downturn. 
VII. ON EMERGING ANTI-COMPETITIVE PRACTICES RELATED TO THE TBTF DOCTRINE 
Recent antitrust investigations have dealt with innovative and highly sophisticated 
financial contracts, such as securitisation, credit default swaps (CDS) or repos, which 
have affected both businesses and consumers.151 Therefore, this section will first 
detail how financial contracts operate before explaining their relevance for the 
purpose of recent investigations. 
It was estimated that the total value of financial derivative contracts was 
US$596 trillion, that is, eight times the size of the real global economy,152 with a 
growth rate of 32 per cent per annum since 1990.153 An excellent definition of 
derivatives is offered by Braithwaite.154 Derivatives are ‘bilateral contracts where the 
rights and obligations of the parties reference an underlying asset, benchmark, index 
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or other variable’. Over-the-counter derivatives were estimated at US$707 trillion,155 
that is nine times the world GDP in 2010.156 An estimate of 65 million derivatives is 
used, for example, to hedge interest rates and credit risk, minimise tax liabilities, or 
speculate on currencies, etc.157 Hedging itself implies a transfer of risk assets.158 
Credit default swaps (CDSs) are financial derivative contracts designed to 
transfer the risk of credit default on debt obligations.159 The classic example is a CDS 
where A and B decide on a notional sum. A agrees to pay B a fixed interest rate on 
that sum (periodic payment) while B agrees to pay a variable rate in return. As a 
result, B, who has a variable rate income but a fixed rate debt, can swap income 
streams with counterparties.160 In practice, CDS are used by investors as a Special 
Purpose Vehicle (SPV) to hedge assets against default risks and assess debtors’ 
creditworthiness. Securitisation is a highly sophisticated process of pooling high-risk 
debt assets from mortgage loans, credit cards and so on, which were sold to a SPV in 
return for securities.161 Put simply, this process makes sure that risks associated with 
loans are shifted away from the original lenders to investors. First, the originator (O) 
applies for a mortgage loan; then the SPV buys O’s mortgage to guarantee the 
remoteness of the cash flows in return for securities which are purchased by investors 
(I). The cash received from I pays O’s loan. Basically, any interest rate or currency risk 
associated with the pooling of such assets is hedged162 using a variety of credit swap 
transactions. Credit rating agencies163 have played a key role in boosting the 
attractiveness of such securitised assets by assigning a credit rating for securities 
issued via the SPV. Investors have been overly reliant on ratings. 
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Previously, the EC has issued guidance on how to calculate the pricing of 
capital injections to ‘rescue’ CDSs.164 Later, the EC sent a statement of objections (SO) 
to 13 investment banks, which have acted as intermediaries in the market for credit 
derivatives.165 Another investigation into CDSs targets the International Swaps and 
Derivatives Association involved in the over-the-counter (OTC) trading of 
derivatives.166 Preliminary indications suggest that the association may have been 
involved in a coordinated effort of investment banks to ‘delay or prevent exchanges’ 
from entering the credit derivatives business.  
Finally, a repo is a collaterised loan where the seller agrees to sell securities at 
a discount (haircut) to the buyer (lender).167 Lenders are rich institutional investors, 
like pension funds and mutual funds, which need a liquid but relatively safe place to 
invest cash. Repo is a generic name for repurchase agreements and sell/buy-backs, 
namely, A sells an asset to B at price X. A also commits itself to repurchase the asset 
from a third party, C, at price Y in the near future or on demand.168 In other words, in 
the event that A defaults, B can sell it to C to offset its loss. Despite being labelled as 
the sale and repurchase of securities, repo is economically a ‘secured deposit’ having 
as its purpose the borrowing and lending of cash. 
In conclusion, all of the above financial contracts are characterised by an 
oligopoly pricing power, asymmetric information, and unequal bargaining power.169 
The proliferation of these contractual instruments demonstrates the value of Minsky’s 
classification of ‘financial fragility’170 as (i) hedge finance, which amounts to liability 
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obligations to be paid with the net cash flows from routine transactions; (ii) 
speculative finance, where cash reserves are insufficient and require borrowing funds 
or selling less-liquid assets; and (iii) Ponzi finance, where there will never be enough 
cash to meet outstanding financial obligations.171 Due to a failure to obtain additional 
financing, Ponzi firms have had to sell their assets, which created Fisher’s ‘price 
deflation’172 for the firms’ assets. 
VIII. ON THE MANIPULATION OF INTEREST RATES DERIVATIVES: YET ANOTHER ANTI-
COMPETITIVE PRACTICE? 
LIBOR is a reference index sponsored by the British Banking Association used to 
calculate short-term interest rates on a range of financial derivative contracts.173 Its 
daily submission indicates what each bank estimates is their cost of unsecured 
borrowing from another bank. Competition authorities worldwide (EC, the UK, the US, 
Canada and Japan) alleged that the Contributor Panel Banks exchanged information 
to undervalue daily submissions and that brokers colluded to manipulate LIBOR to 
raise the profits from certain derivatives. In other words, under competitive 
conditions, banks would submit their valuation independently to move away from 
forms of artificial collusion. In the US USD LIBOR scandal,174 antitrust damage claims 
were rejected on the grounds of failure to prove conspiracy and restraint of trade, 
lack of antitrust standing and impossibility of recovery on the basis of the ‘indirect 
purchaser rule’.175 The US court ruled that there cannot be damage recovery without 
showing that the actual loss stems from a reduction of competition or that any harm 
is the result of the defendant’s behaviour.176 This interpretation endorses the 
traditional approach to antitrust harm, which requires proof of a resulting restriction 
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of competition in the market for interbank loans. Since LIBOR displays only 
information about ‘prevailing rates’, the court went on to say that LIBOR quotations, 
even in the event that they were set artificially, did not correspond to the actual 
interest rate charged for interbank loans. This legal reasoning lacks a great deal of 
pragmatism, since the authors of this innovative anti-competitive practice are banks 
which have unfortunately been excluded from antitrust scrutiny. This fact also justifies 
the Court’s reservation. Semantically different from the economics of collusion, the 
manipulation of exchange rates is one of the means used to deceive the bank panel 
and implement fraud. 
Recent investigations have enquired whether the submitting banks 
intentionally undervalued LIBOR submissions, whether traders at banks and hedge 
funds tried to influence the rate to speculate on interest rate derivatives, and 
whether traders employed within Contributor Panel Banks received information 
about rates, either directly or through intermediaries, such as inter-dealer brokers. 
The heated question has turned to whether LIBOR should be assimilated into anti-
competitive practices such as price-fixing and be criminalised, as are cartels.177 
Exchange rate manipulation has been unknown as an anti-competitive practice, while 
the banking sector has been practically excluded from any competition intervention 
against what is known as collusion by brokers/bank panels against consumers to fix 
the market price artificially. For example, Barclays178 submitted low US$ LIBOR as a 
result of management instructions, which began in late August 2007. The EC and the 
UK Financial Services Authority investigated Barclays’ alleged infringements between 
traders and rate-setters for the Euro Interbank Offer Rate (EURIBOR) in particular 
through mis-selling interest rate swaps to small businesses, ie low-cost protection 
against rising interest rates.179 In practice, information asymmetries between 
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informed contract holders and ordinary investors result in price inefficiency,180 with 
clear evidence that the share prices of banks were artificially altered by the short 
selling of derivatives. Specifically, a manipulator sells the shares of a company short 
and then spreads negative rumours about the company’s prospects.181 This has led to 
calls for another EU proposal introducing bans on naked short selling if the price of a 
financial instrument falls by a significant amount in a single day.182 
The above recent investigations and the record fine of £1.7 billion for the Euro 
interest rate derivatives cartel operated by Barclays, Deutsche Bank, RBS and Société 
Générale and for the Yen interest rate derivatives cartel run by USB, RBS, Deutsche 
Bank, JPMorgan and Citygroup,183 demonstrate the determination of antitrust 
enforcers and policy-makers184 to treat sophisticated financial derivative contracts as 
anti-competitive practices. This is yet another indication that the TBTF185 doctrine is 
being constantly eroded.186 
IX. END OF STORY: END OF CRISIS? 
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Finally, it is not possible to understand the dimension of the current crisis without a 
proper critique of the role neoliberalism has played. It is known that neoliberalism 
called for the deregulation of financial markets187 in the first instance and for a weak 
state.188 Neoliberalism departs fundamentally from ordoliberal ideas of individual 
freedom as coerced by the state, or as Bonefeld put it,189 this ‘ordered freedom’ 
positions itself somewhere between collectivism and laissez-faire liberalism, as a true 
guardian of markets. As the ordoliberal ideology emerged from attempts to address 
the problems created by the economic crisis in the 1920s, it has led to a different 
model of liberal governance, which is generally distrustful of markets. In other words, 
ordoliberalism was originally packaged as a hybrid product which has prided itself on 
being sympathetic (a ‘humane’ economy)190 to the sociological effects of 
industrialisation and market competition on workers. However, Rüstow contradicts 
the human economy at least for ‘unionised’ workers who threaten the ‘weak’ state.191 
His ideas hold water as regards pressure groups, such as lobbyists, monopolists or 
even oligopolists. For Eucken, in contrast, the ‘well-being of capitalism’ is almost 
synonymous with being competitive, risk-taking and self-responsible.192 In other 
words, it is inconceivable that where the entrepreneurial spirit fails in practice, society 
should take on the responsibility for such a failure. This is precisely the rather hidden 
message of the ‘social market economy’ according to Bonefeld,193 namely, a social 
policy that ensures that individuals act as self-responsible entrepreneurs. Applied to 
our crisis scenario, the big players of speculative games will have to agree to 
demonstrate social and corporate responsibility if, as Vanberg put it,194 such players 
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‘systematically’ perform poorly. Reflecting on the social and economic cost of the EU 
crisis through bail-outs this principle has failed in the EU. 
For Röpke, the challenge of capitalism lay in the measure of state intervention, 
ie a ‘crisis of interventionism’.195 This is also true for the EU crisis. Academics agree on 
one vital point: the real disaster did not happen because banks started to fail, but 
because the EU and its Member States rescued precisely those national champions of 
poor performance and, in the case of toxic assets, of fraud. 
The final question after the assessment of law in action and neoliberal policy, 
as has been implemented in real life, is to challenge the ideological foundations of 
neoliberalism as a proper model of social and economic governance. It is recognised 
that no social change can take place without shaking the economic ideology and the 
politics underpinning such ideology. Neoliberalism has been portrayed as ‘the 
ascendancy of financial capital over industrial capital in the pursuit of profit’.196 
Capitalism survived several generalised recessions (1974–75 and 1980–82) with high 
unemployment, a collapse in investment, and high inflation.197 As has previously been 
explained in Section IV, because of the lost battle over the achievement of Keynesian 
‘full employment’, this idealistic goal198 has had to surrender to austere monetary 
policies to combat inflation. This influenced policy-makers to re-configure their focus 
on labour rigidities, market imperfections and distortions and to call for aggressive 
competition for both workers and capital.199 As O’Connor suggested, ‘coercive’ 
competition replaced the ‘socialisation’ of economic activity by embedding at its 
foundation ideas of state rationalisation, market contestability, and mobility. How 
were these three ingredients implemented? Contestability of markets called for the 
prohibition of discrimination and eradication of market barriers to ensure a level 
playing field which would, in turn, guarantee labour mobility so as to enable capital to 
be relocated profitably elsewhere and to facilitate workers’ wage flexibility, ie 
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cheaper labour.200 In contrast, the Keynesian vision stands out for higher wages and 
extensive social protection.201 
According to O’Connor, neoliberalism re-established unemployment in the 
early 1980s so as to curb welfare benefits and collective bargaining agreements which 
was followed by the complete liberalisation of capital markets.202 Capital mobility 
enabled governments to finance their fiscal deficits, by putting upward pressure on 
the exchange rate and domestic taxation.203 Ultimately, due to fierce competition 
among capital owners, financialisation pushed down credit rates and risk 
premiums.204 Others argued that financialisation contributed to a sluggish overall 
performance based on consumption and export-oriented growth models.205  
Regrettably, this re-configuration of influence has essentially led to a 
weakening of the social and economic position of labour. Perhaps, one of the most 
pervasive drivers of neoliberalism lies primarily in its ambition to achieve the global 
financialisation of markets. This architectural configuration is plausible since the idea 
of economic integration has been the fundamental principle of an internal market: 
where individuals’ migration is achieved through free movement, and mobility has 
served this purpose as a cheaper source of labour which boosts capital profits 
through workers’ flexibility; the free movement of capital has achieved 
financialisation and the free movement of goods has succeeded in opening up 
markets through active competition.  
As alluded to earlier in Section V.(A), under Article 119 TFEU, the idea of ‘free 
competition’ disguises the neoliberal idea of ‘coercive competition’ rather than of 
‘ordered freedom’ since its macroeconomic foundations, which endorse explicitly an 
efficient use of Union resources by its Member States, bear much of the neoliberal 
austerity imprint in the convergence criteria rather than the ‘human’ ordoliberal 
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ideology previously formulated. This is revealed by another position supported by 
German neoliberalism206 which argued that monetary policy should ‘complement’ 
monopoly policy to maintain the rule of law established by the ordoliberal concept of 
‘ordered’ constitutional freedom. Thus, on the one hand, at a microeconomic level, 
this ‘order’ will safeguard individual economic rights, such as free enterprise or the 
freedom of contract, except when this promotes monopolies and, on the other hand, 
at a macroeconomic level, the rule of law will safeguard price stability, output, the 
distribution of income and the allocation of resources. Since the breakdown of 
Bretton Woods, the ‘macroeconomics trilemma’207 of open markets with free 
competition has favoured floating exchange rates without capital control to the 
detriment of other objectives of monetary policy.208 In times of crisis coercive forms 
of competition dictated the EU’s macroeconomic policy of restructuring banking and 
dominated the free competition paradigm at microeconomic level. 
In conclusion, while the architectural representations of coercive freedom 
have not been entirely in the negative in terms of achieved impact on the economy 
and society as a whole – for example, one cannot deny certain positive benefits of 
free movement of EU citizens209 – the Achilles’ heel of the above freedoms is 
currently financialisation being used as a means to misappropriate the human capital 
to uncover corporate responsibility for speculative pursuits.210 Furthermore, the 
social costs of this full-blown financial crisis have shown that the speculative gains of 
this kind have not been short-termism.211 Rather, those in pursuit of speculation of 
profits have embraced in the long run the mature cost of a financial servicing industry 
which was even highly respected as a successful driver of capitalism until its ‘Big Fail’ 
finally spread across the globe. Finally, the remaking of capitalism would not have 
been possible without active deregulation, a previous lack of competition intervention 
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in the banking sector and an aggressive competitive culture. On a positive note 
remain, however, the recent derivative cartels investigated and fined by the EC. These 
recent developments infuse EU taxpayers, who must bear the costs of previous bail-
outs, with optimism for the future, and demonstrate a much welcome change of 
perspective on financial derivatives.  
 
